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Economists have long held the belief that public goods will be
undersupplied when funded through voluntary contributions. To
many, this suggested that the government's power to command
payments through the tax system was needed to provide such goods.
More recently, several incentive-compatible mechanisms have been
proposed as provision schemes (see Groves and Ledyard [1976],
Tideman and Tullock [1977], and Smith [1980] for examples). Since
these schemes share a common trait - they are quite complex to
implement - they are generally viewed as an alternative to the tax
system for the government to directly provide public goods.
Among the simpler mechanisms that have been studied are
voluntary contribution games. Robyn Dawes and several of his
colleagues have explored contribution games in a setting involving
a binary decision, to contribute a Nixed amount or not, by the
members of the group. Palfrey and Rosenthal [1984] analyzed one
1An earlier version of this paper was presented at the
Economic Science Association Fall Meetings, October, 1988, in
Tucson. We wish to thank the participants of our session and
Hark Isaac in particular for helpful comments. Funding was
provided by the Council for Research and Creative Work at the
University of Colorado and Resources for the Future.
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such game and found that it is capable of generating both
efficient and inefficient outcomes.
Recently, Bagnoli and Lipman [1989] have investigated two
contribution games in which the individuals decide the level of
their own contributions. In the first, the society must decide
whether or not to provide a public good. In the second, not only
must they decide whether or not to provide the public good but
also how much to provide. Bagnoli and Lipman showed that their
first contribution game fully implemented the core in undominated
perfect eqiuilibrium2 while the second game fully implemented the
core in successively undominated strictly perfect equilibria. 3
Clearly, the more interesting version of Bagnoli and Lipman's
contribution games is the one in which the level of provision must
also be determined and this is the version we address here.
Laboratory experiments provide a useful device for testing the
behavioral requirements behind mechanism design. In the case of
Bagnoli and Lipman's work, the desirability of running
experiments follows from two behavioral aspects of their
2 This means that the set of core outcomes concides with the
set of undominated perfect equilibrium outcomes. The latter are
the trembling hand perfect Nash equilibrium outcomes in the game
after the removal of all dominated strategies.
The details are presented in Bagnoli and Lipman. Briefly,
successively undominated means one strips out all of the dominated
strategies, checks to see if this process has created more
dominated strategies and continues until all of the remaining
strategies are undominated. One then seeks the strictly
trembling hand perfect Nash equilibria to the reduced game. The
difference between strictly trembling hand perfect and trembling
hand perfect is that, for the latter, the strategies must be
robust to some set of small trembles while for the former, the
strategies must be robust to all sets of small trembles.
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mechanism. First, they employed refinements of the Nash
Equilibrium to implement the core and so one might wonder whether
the refinements are representative of actual behavior. Second,
even after employing a refinement, there are multiple equilibria
and so one might also wonder whether or not the players can focus
on one of them. For the simple problem of whether or not to
provide the public good, Bagnoli and Lipman's analysis is
supported by the experimental results of Bagnoli and McKee
[19891.
In this paper we report on some experiments which were designed
to evaluate Bagnoli and Lipman's predictions in the multiple unit
collective good setting and to address the broader question of the
behavioral robustness of some refinements to Nash equilibrium.
From our results it appears that the refinement employed is not
an adequate representation of behavior and that individuals have
much more difficulty focussing on an equilibrium in the multiple
units setting than they did in the single units setting. This is
not surprising since the multiple unit game is considerably more
complex, admits many more equilibrium strategies, and the
refinement necessary to implement the core is much stronger than
in the single unit setting. Given the additional complexity of
the game and the more stringent refinement required to implement
the core, our results are much more positive than we had expected.
That is, we do find that the subjects are able to achieve the
predicted equilibrium with some degree of regularity. However,
the results are such that one would not wish to place much
reliance on the proposed mechanism to provide public goods.
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2. Theoretical Foundations4
The basic structure of a contribution game is relatively
simple. Contributions to the provision of a public good are
solicited from the agents in the economy. The cost of the good,
the initial wealth of all agents, and the valuations for the
public good of all agents are common knowledge. If the
contributions sum to at least the cost of the good it is provided
otherwise all contributions are returned.
Now consider an economy with I agents indexed i - 1, 2, ... , I.
Each agent has a quasi-linear utility function u - u(d) + w where
w is wealth and d is an element in the decision set D - (0, 1,
... , M) where d is interpreted as how much of the public good to
provide and the cost of production are C(d) with C(d) < C(d+l).
There are many ways one could structure the contribution game
for this multiple unit case. For example, one might suppose that
the agents choose contributions and the amount provided is the
most that can be given these contributions. One must also specify
some rule, such as the return of contributions, to cover the case
where the contributions are insufficient to cover the cost of the
first unit. This game does not implement the core.5
Instead, Bagnoli and Lipman consider a sequential structure of
the following type. In the first round, the agents begin by
contributing some non-negative amount. If contributions are less
In this section we provide the barest outline of the game
investigated by Bagnoli and Lipman. The reader is referred to
their paper for the full details.
See Bagnoli and Lipman for an example that shows why this
conclusion holds.
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than c(l) then they are returned and no units of the public good
are provided. If the contributions sum to exactly c(k) then k
units are provided and the next round of contributions, with k as
the new basis, begins. The process stops when the contributions
in given round do not sum to the cost of an additional unit of the
public good. The most difficult part of the game to specify is
what happens if contributions fall strictly between c(k) and
c(k+l) for some k greater than 1. As Bagnoli and Lipman note,
such a situation is "falling short" in one sense and "having
enough" in the other and so it is unclear what the appropriate
incentives should be. They assume that the excess over c(k) is
refunded in proportion to the actual contributions and then
proceed in the analysis as if exactly c(k) had been contributed.
While it is clear that the multiple unit contribution game is
similar to the single unit game, one must keep in mind that there
is a crucial difference. In the latter, the citizens need only
decide whether or not to provide an exogenously fixed level of the
public good while in the former, they must decide how much, if
any, to provide. The problem of obtaining the efficient outcome
is much more difficult and requires a very strong refinement
notion, successively undominated strictly perfect equilibria. The
use of such a strong refinement immediately raises the question of
its behavioral realism. Further, since equilibrium is not unique,
whether the agents can focus is another open question. Finally,
the additional complexity of the game raises questions about its
ability to predict actual behavior.
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3. Experimental Implementation and Design
In the single units case reported in Bagnoli and McKee subjects
posted contributions to the provision of one unit of the public
good. These sessions were conducted in a classroom setting since
the amount of information to be transmitted to the subjects
during the session was quite limited. Essentially the subjects
had to be informed only of the total contribution of their group
and whether the good was provided. The multiple unit setting is
far more complicated and necessitated the use of a computerized
facility.
In setting up the laboratory environment for the multiple units
setting we adopted a simplifying procedure to make the task
clearer the subjects. In our sessions we chose to implement this
sequential game procedure by setting the step size to one unit for
each decision round. The subjects were asked to post their
contributions for the first unit. If it was provided they went on
to the second and so on for as long as the sum of the
contributions met or exceeded the cost. For the stage at which
the contributions failed to cover the cost the contributions were
returned to the subjects. Thus, the experimental setting strictly
repeats the single unit game over a sequence. As Bagnoli and
Lipman showed, in proving that every core outcome is achieved by
some equilibrium, one such equilibrium has a succession of rounds
with one additional unit purchased at each round and with
contributions adding to exactly the marginal cost.
The subjects were provided with the information prescribed by
the theory. That is, they were told the incomes and valuations of
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the members of their group for all units and the threshold value
for each unit. The continuation rule was explained as follows.
The individuals were to post their contribution to the provision
of the good at stage 1. If the sum of the contributions was not
sufficient to cover the cost, then the contributions would be
returned and the game would end. If the sum met or exceeded the
cost (threshold) the unit was supplied and the group went on to
the next unit and so on until the sum of the contributions in that
stage was insufficient to have the unit supplied. For this unit
the contributions were returned. At this point the period ended.
There was a maximum of 4 stages per period and the parameters were
set such that the agents would be indifferent between having the
fourth unit or not. The core allocation provided for 3 or 4 units
of the good. This structure was constant across all treatments.
The parameters (incomes, valuations, and thresholds) are provided
in Appendix A.
In many experimental settings repetition is necessary to allow
the subjects to "learn the game". For the experiments reported
here the sessions were conducted for 15 periods in one treatment
and for 6 to 8 periods in the other treatment. The repetition
allows learning and it also provides the opportunity to test for
conditions which affect the speed of convergence to equilibrium.
In the single unit setting, Bagnoli and McKee found that
convergence was slower for heterogenous groups. However, there is
a question that there may be a repeated game effect when the
subjects are assigned to the same group for a finite period game.
Bagnoli and McKee confirmed that such effects were absent. One of
the most important design questions is whether or not to scramble
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the subjects between rounds of the experiment. If one does not,
then the subjects must view themselves as playing a finitely
repeated game. If the "stage" game is the game that was solved,
then technically, only the last round in the experiment is a test
of the theory. Thus, the prior rounds cannot be used to evaluate
the theory but do permit the subjects to gain experience with the
game. This explains why many experimenters have switched to a
methodology in which the subjects are scrambled between rounds.
If done correctly, such scrambling allows all of the data to be
used in testing the theory since the subjects have played a
sequence of unrelated one-shot games. The disadvantage of
scrambling is that one gives up any possibility of drawing
inferences about the equilibria in the repeated setting. For
example, in finitely repeated games, one subgame perfect
equilibrium has the players playing the one-shot equilibrium in
each period. By scrambling the subjects, one cannot learn whether
the subjects playing the game are playing the one-shot equilibrium
over and over. In the current paper we deal with this conflict
differently by introducing "scrambling" of the subjects between
rounds as a treatment.
In the experiments testing the single unit contribution game,
Bagnoli and McKee chose not to scramble the subjects. For the
multiple unit casea, we felt that the extreme complexity suggested
that scrambling was probably worthwhile. In addition, the
computerized setting dramatically reduced the delays associated
with scrambling. Hence, we ran both treatments to allow us to
compare our results with those of the single unit experiments and
to compare the scrambled and unscrambled treatments.
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In the first treatment, the subjects were assigned to a single
group for the duration of the session and they were told that this
would be the case. In the second, the subjects were scrambled
such that the group composition varied in each period. In this
treatment the subjects played 2 practice rounds to begin with.
The scrambling procedure consumed some time so we were unable to
run as many periods as in the unscrambled treatment. Our results
here are especially interesting since the multiple units game
admits the possibility of many more equilibrium strategies than
did the single unit game.
All group assignments are done via the software and the
subjects were allocated to groups of five such that their nearest
neighbors were not in their groups. The sessions which did not
involve scrambling the subjects were told the session would run
for 15 periods. In the sessions involving scrambling we did not
inform the subjects of the total number of sessions in advance
and we varied the number of periods.
All sessions were conducted in the LEAP (Laboratory for
Economics and Psychology) facility at the University of Colorado.
This facility consists of a dedicated MicroVAX and 16 terminals
(one for the monitor) housed in a room in the psychology building.
The terminals are located in booths which prevent the subjects
from observing their neighbors' screens. Subjects were recruited
from principles and intermediate economics classes. The
instructions (provided in Appendix B) were read out loud while the
subjects followed along on their copies (and practice sessions
were conducted as described above). Questions were answered
before the session began. With the payoff structure w~e utilized
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participants would earn approximately $1.30 per period if no units
were supplied and upwards of $2.45 if three units were supplied.
In practice subjects earned between $12.00 and $20.00 for their
participation and appeared to be quite highly motivated.
4. Hypotheses and Empirical Evaluation
All groups have five individuals. From our sessions we have
data on 6 groups from the "no scrambling" treatment and 11 groups
from the "full scrambling" treatment. The aggregate contributions
for the groups are reported in Appendix A. Due to space
constraints, the data for the individual subjects are not
presented here but are available from the authors.
Theorem 2 predicts that equilibrium behavior of the players
will generate outcomes that are in the core. That is, the
allocations that result will be Pareto optimal and individually
rational. Testable hypotheses based on this theorem (given the
parameters of our design) are:
Hypothesis 16 The groups will provide three units of the good in
each period.
Hypothesis 2: The contributions in each stage will sum to the
threshold.
Hypothesis 3: The agents' contributions will be individually
rational. In the context of SUSPE, this requires that the
contributions be less than the valuation of the good at each
stage.
Hypothesis 1 constitutes a fairly weak version of the
prediction embodied in Theorem 2. It is possible to accept this
6
With the schedule of valuations such that the fourth unit
is marginal we expect that risk averse agents will tend to fail
to provide this unit.
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hypothesis and have no allocations that are in the core since the
aggregate contributions exceed the cost of the good.
Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to begin our empirical assessment
of the behavior of our subjects with this very weak test.
In general, the data provide some support for Hypothesis 1.
That is, the groups are largely successful in providing the good
at efficient levels. Beginning with the data from the no
scrambling sessions, we find that the groups are successful at
having three units of the good provided in 50 of 90 observations
(56%).8 There are a further 6 cases where the third unit is not
supplied but the contributions sum to 49 tokens or more. For the
full scrambling treatment three units are supplied in 38 of 79
possible cases (48%). Again, there are 7 additional cases where
the contributions for the third unit are between 49 and 50 tokens.
In a little more than half of the possible cases we have three
units being supplied.
This result might suggest that the individuals have some
difficulty focussing on an equilibrium strategy. In some cases,
the failure to supply three units can be traced to the behavior of
one individual. The behavior that is most detrimental to the
We must reiterate that the game implements the core in
that the allocations are P0 and individually rational. There is
no implication that all members of the group will post positive
contributions. If the threshhold is met without agent j's
contribution then the individually rational action of j is to
contribute zero.
8Group 1 in the "no scrambling" treatment had considerable
difficulty focussing on an equilibrium. As we will show later,
this is due to the behavior of one individual. If we omit this
group we find that the subjects supplied 3 units in 48 of 75
possible cases (64%).
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group success occurs when an individual is very volatile in his
choice of contribution. We will return to this issue in our
discussion of Hypothesis 3.
If we look at the provision levels by unit9 we find that our
results are more in agreement with those of the theory (and the
single unit cases). For the no scrambling treatment the good is
provided in 189 of the 229 (83%) cases when the opportunity
existed. Again, the results are comparable for the scrambling
treatment where we find the good is provided in 166 of 214 (78%)
cases.
However, the results from the multiple units setting are less
robust than those of the single units experiments where the good
was provided in 85 of the 98 cases where it was efficient to do
so. The subjects in the single unit case played the strategies
consistent with the refinement - undominated perfect equilibrium.
In the multiple unit setting the stronger refinement does not
appear to accurately capture the subjects' behavior.
Hypotheses 2 and 3 constitute the cornerstone of our evaluation
of Theorem 2. The core allocation requires that the total
contributions made by the group sum to the cost of the good for
each of the units. Recall that when the contributions sum to
more than 50 all members of the group will prefer a lower level of
contribution. A glance at the data in the Appendix will indicate
In the single unit case reported by Bagnoli and tMcKee the
subjects had the opportunity to contribute in all possible cases.
The design of the multiple units setting does not allow this. If
the group fails to provide the second unit they cannot go on to
the third or the fourth. To adjust for this design feature we
will report instances of contributions meeting or exceeding the
threshhold as a fraction of the potential opportunities.
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that all of the groups were not entirely successful in this
regard. The total number of observations across groups, periods
and stages is found by taking 3 stages per period, 15 periods, and
the number of groups for each treatment. For the no scrambling
treatment we observe the contributions summing to 50 (the
announced threshold) in only 13 of 270 observations. For the full
scrambling treatment the corresponding figure is 5 of 237
observations.
In much of laboratory experimental work, researchers argue for
the use of a "band" or range of outcomes to define the
equilibrium. This is because there are many coordination problems
which make it difficult to achieve the theoretically predicted
outcome exactly. In our case we will consider a range of the
level of group contributions on the basis that there may be some
coordination problems and that there may not be a clear focal
equilibrium for those groups with different income and/or
valuation distributions. If we take 47.5 to 52.5 as a range
where the aggregate contributions are "close" to the predicted
equilibrium then for the no scrambling treatment we find the
a.ggregate contributions are within the band in 97 of 270. For the
:scrambling treatment the figure is 60 of 237. These scores are
considerably worse than those for the single unit case where
Bagnoli and McKee report that 53 of 98 observations were within
the defined band.
The mean total contributions by stage (unit) for the "no
scrambling" treatment are: unit 1 - 53.37 (5.77); unit 2 - 52.2
(6.22); unit 3 - 52.99 (4.79). In each case the aggregate
contributions statistically exceed 50. The equilibrium
14
predictions are based on risk neutral individuals. The "money
back guarantee" is provided to mitigate the effects of risk
aversion on the contribution behavior of the subjects. Given the
rule for progression, the cost of falling short of the threshold
is greater in the multiple unit setting than in the single unit
setting. If the sum of the contributions does not cover the cost,
the group loses the opportunity to advance to the subsequent units
and earn the associated surpluses. It is not surprising that the
aggregate contributions exceed the threshold here.
Individual rationality in our setting requires that no
individual contribute more than the induced value of the good to
that person. We introduce this as Hypothesis 3. As we have noted
above, the data set comprised of individual behavior is too
voluminous to include in this paper. Thus we will relate the
results and repeat that the individual data are available on
request.
We identify subjects as a/b indicating subject b in group a.
The observation that the subjects are playing dominated strategies
and/or strategies which are not strictly perfect is sufficient to
refute hypothesis 3. A strategy which is clearly irrational is to
contribute more than your valuation for each unit. Less
obviously, another dominated strategy would be contributing in
excess of your valuation in an early stage in an attempt to move
the group on to later stages where this overcontribution can be
recouped. We find no evidence of the former behavior and only
weak evidence of the latter. Subject 1/5 did engage in a strategy
which resulted in the group being unable to focus on an
equilibrium. In round 4 this subject started to play a strategy
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which involved posting a very large contribution (not quite his
valuation) for the first unit and then posting a contribution of
zero for the next unit. The group seemed unable to adjust to this
behavior with the result that it was only able to have the second
unit supplied in one round after round 3. Since the group had
been successful when 1/5 did not engage in such behavior, his new
strategy is not strictly perfect and does not satisfy the
refinement.
There are no other examples of such behavior in the no
scrambling treatment nor are there any in the scrambling
treatment. There are periodic instances of subjects apparently
"experimenting" with different strategies in the no scrambling
sessions. In the single unit experiments of Bagnoli and McKee it
is apparent that the equilibrium selected did involve playing the
same one-shot game equilibrium at each stage or round and there
was a complete absence of individually irrational behavior once a
"learning period" had elapsed. In general, in the multiple unit
case we find some support for Hypothesis 3. The individuals are
playing strategies which are individually rational but in the
unscrambled setting they do not seem to be playing the same one-
shot game equilibrium.
Since we induce all values we are able to compute the level of
group welfare attained by each group in the sessions. These
figures are reported in Appendix A. With the exception of Gl NS
the groups under the "no scrambling" treatment attained better
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than 66% of the theoretical maximum welfare level.10 The results
for the scrambling treatment are less robust. Here the welfare
levels are closer to 50% of the theoretical level with the
exception of G11 S. A Mann-Whitney test yields the result that
the efficiency scores are lower for the scrambling treatment. The
z-statistic is 2.27.
5. Conclusions and Remarks
We find some support for the theorem that the agents will play
the refined strategies necessary to achieve an equilibrium that is
in the core. Overall, the rate of success is much less than in
the single unit experiments reported by Bagnoli and McKee.
Indeed, from the aggregate results reported above it is clear that
the multiple units game is much less likely to implement the core
than the single unit game. Thus, our results raise serious
questions about the predictive success of Bagnoli and Lipman's
Theorem 2. For the multiple unit case, it does not appear that
the contribution game they studied is likely to generate core
allocations. That is, unlike the single unit case where a core
outcome is likely if that contribution game is employed, this is
much less likely to occur in the multiple unit case.
From a policy perspective this is a disappointing result.
Since many of the other incentive compatible mechanisms have
1G1 NS is, of course, the group in which one individual
adopted a strategy that was clearly not compatible with the
refinement to the Nash equilibrium. Further, in GI NS the group
was comprised of individuals with different payoffs to the public
good. From the work of Bagnoli and Mckee it appears that this
type of heterogeneity is difficult for the group to deal with.
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substantial administrative requirements and generate budget
surpluses which must be disposed in a manner which will not affect
the allocation of resources, the search for a voluntary provision
scheme seems worthwhile. Our experiments show that Bagnoli and
Lipman's scheme, which theoretically yields efficient outcomes,
appears not to work well in practice. The difference in practical
usefulness between Bagnoli and Lipman's single and multiple unit
games raises questions for the class of games investigated by
Dawes and others. In previous work these games were applied to a
binary output decision and, to date, these games have not been
evaluated in multiple unit settings. This is a worthy topic for
future research.
We do wish to note that the mechanism performed much better
than we expected. The subjects face a complicated task and the
refinement required to implement the core is quite strong.
From the welfare levels data it is clear that some groups were
able to focus on an equilibrium and stick with this. Group 4 in
the no scrambling treatment is a case in point. This group
generated welfare levels very close to the theoretical maximum.
In general, however, the welfare levels achieved even in the
later rounds are well below the theoretical levels.
It remains for us to briefly investigate whether some features
of the experimental design are responsible for the results we have
obtained. For the no scrambling treatment the subjects were
required to make many more decisions than those in the single unit
setting of Bagnoli and McKee. Each unit requires the same
decision as each stage of the single unit setting. In addition,
the strategy space is much larger in the multiple unit setting.
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Both of these factors may have led the subjects to "experiment"
with different strategies. Inspection of the results reported in
Appendix A shows that the groups were least successful in the
middle rounds of the no scrambling sessions. Indeed, the average
welfare level, by period, for periods 1 through 5 was 79.62; for
periods 6 through 10 was 73.93; and for periods 11 through 15 was
79.29. It appears that after some experimentation, which lead to
failure to implement the efficient solution, the groups returned
to their previous equilibrium strategies. The welfare levels in
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1 2 -3 4
48.00 - - -
64.00 61.50 50.00 15.00
50.50 58.50 47.50 -
55.50 52.00 52.00 10.00
55.50 46.00 - -
50.50 49.50 - -










































44.00 - - -
55.00 52.00 48.50 -
45.50 - - -
49.00 - - -
52.50 56.50 53.50 30.40
52.00 53.00 55.00 33.00
48.00 - - -




































































































































Ea 730.0 1184.7 1281.3 1360.0 1241.2 1110.0 1800.0
Eb 157.0 429.1 408.0 490.0 449.7 448.0 600.0
Note: Ea refers to the
Eb refers to the
aggregate over all 15 periods.
aggregate over the last 5 periods.
"Scrambling Treatment"
Groups
























































Initial Data: Incomes & Valuations
The distributions of incomes and valuations are generated within
the software according to the following mapping:
Income Distributions
(Shares of Total Income)
Subj# 1 2 3 4 5
a) 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
b) 0.28 0.28 0.15 0.15 0.14
c) 0.28 0.24 0.20 0.14 0.14
d) 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.14
Payoff Distributions
(Shares of Total Payoff)
Subj# 1 2 3 4 5
x) 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
y) 0.30 0.30 0.15 0.15 0.10
z) 0.30 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.10
Then the income-payoff combinations are selected as initial
conditions.
Income-Payoff Combination #3 is comprised of income distribution
a) and payoff distribution z). Income-payoff Combination #4 is
comprised of income distribution a) for group 1 of the session
(three groups run at one time), b) for group 2, and c) for group 3
and payoff distribution x).
GI NS, G2 NS, and G3 NS used income/payoff combination #4.
G4 NS, G5 NS, and G6 NS used income/payoff combination #3.
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Appendix B
Experimental Instructions - No scrambling case
Experimental Instructions
This is an experiment in decision making. Several research
organizations have provided funds for this research. Read the
instructions carefully. If you follow them and make good
decisions, you may earn a considerable amount of money. This
money will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.
Organization
You have been organized into groups of five persons. Each
group will consist of the same five persons for the duration of
the session. The specific identities of the other persons in your
group will not be revealed to you. You may not communicate with
anyone else in the room during the session. Failure to observe
this instruction will result in the termination of the experiment
and the forfeiture of all monies earned.
The whole session will last for fifteen periods each of which
will be comprised of several stages. At each stage during each
period you will be required to make a decision and your total
earnings for the session will depend on these decisions.
At the beginning of each period the screen will announce to you
the income you will receive in tokens for the period. These
tokens will be exchanged for money, at the rate of ___ cents per
token, at the end of the session. Also provided on the screen is
the income of each of the other persons in your group. This
information may vary from period to period so read it carefully
each period.
For each stage you will be asked to post a contribution. If
the sum of the contributions from the group meets or exceeds the
threshold level reported on the screen the group will receive an
additional bundle of tokens to be shared by all the members of the
group regardless of their actual contributions. The accual shares
to each person are reported on the screen as part of ycour
information.
Each period will proceed as follows. You will receive a new
income in takens. For Stage 1 you will post a contribution. If
the sum of the contributions for the group meet or exceed the
threshold for the stage the additional tokens will be provided.
If the threshold is met at Stage 1 you will go on the Stage 2. If
the threshold is met at Stage 2 the second bundle of additional
tokens will be provided and the group will go on to Stage 3 and so
on until the sum of the contributions from the group does not meet
the threshold. At this point the period ends and a new period
will begin.
At each stage you will be informed of your remaining income at
this stage. This is calculated by subtracting your contributions
to successful provision of the additional bundles from your
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initial income. Your share of the bundles of additional tokens is
not provided to you until the end of the period. Thus, your share
of the additional tokens
cannot be used to contribute to the provision of additional
bundles.
Contributions in excess of the threshold are kept by the
persons running the experiment. For the Stage at which the
threshold is not attained your contributions are returned. Thus
your income for the Period is computed as follows: your initial
income @i(plus) your accumulated shares of the additional tokens
for those stages in which they are supplied @i(minus) the sum of
your actual contributions in those periods for which the threshold
is met or exceeded.
There are some simple rules regarding the contributions you may
post. You may enter any contribution from zero up to the level of
your income for the PERIOD minus your PREVIOUS CONTRIBUTIONS for
the period. Contributions in excess of your current net income
will not be accepted. Enter your contribution at the terminal in
numbers. You may contribute part tokens, e.g. 0.5 tokens or 4.3
tokens. You will have two minutes to decide on your contribution
and to enter it.
Once the contributions have been entered, the computer will
compute the totals for each group. If the sum of the
contributions meets or exceeds the threshold level for that stage
the bundle of additional tokens will be provided to the group and
your share will be paid to your account. You will be informed by
the computer of the TOTAL contribution of your group but not the
contributions of the individual members. You will be informed of
the remaining balance of each of the members of your group. If
the threshold for the current stage is met or exceeded the
computer will automatically proceed to the next stage.
We have provided a sample screen and session which will be
presented when you have all finished reading these instructions.




Period #1 ID # 2 Period #1, Stage #1
(5 Persons per proup, Your Balance = 30.0
4 Stages per period) Enter your
Contribution
The INCOMES for this period:
yours 30 tokens
others 30 30 30 30 tokens
THRESHOLD CONTRIBUTION of your group
for each stage is 50 tokens
If this threshold is met or exceeded,








Your returns for the
period are
tokens
(To be distributed at





























The screen is comprised of 4 parts and is divided into boxes.
The large box on the left is the Information Screen and it shows
the period at the top. Next you see the income for yourself and
for the other members of your group. You are informed of the
group's THRESHOLD CONTRIBUTION (here 50 tokens) and your own
payoff if the threshold is met or exceeded for each of the
potential stages for this period. At the bottom you see the total
payoff for the group for each stage.
At the top of the right side of the screen you see the box
marked "Contribution". This informs you of the period and the
stage, your current balance for the period and asks you to enter
your contribution.
The middle box on the right side reports the RESULTS. Once all
of the members of your group have posted their contributions the
computer sums these contributions and will tell you the total and
whether the additional bundle of tokens (the "good") is provided
at this stage. This box also informs you of your returns for the
period.
The final box marked "Message" is reserved for telling you when
you should push the RETURN key to move along in the session.
The Session
A session might proceed as follows. For Period 1, Stage 1 say
you post 11 tokens as your contribution. The total for your
group is 54 which exceeds the threshold so you receive the message
in the RESULTS box that the additional tokens are provided. The
Group proceeds to Stage 2. Your current income is 19 tokens (your
original income of 30 tokens minus the 11 you posted at Stage 1).
You post a contribution of 8 tokens. This time the total for the
group is 38 which is less than the threshold. This time the
RESULTS box gives you the message that the additional tokens are
not provided and your contribution is returned. One additional
bundle of tokens has been provided in this period.
For Period 1 your total income is 30 plus 20 minus 11 - 39
tokens. And this is added to your account to be paid at the end
of the session.
Now you would proceed to the next period.
r
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